What are the potential challenges facing the Australia-US alliance? Do these challenges mean that Australia needs to reconsider its continued reliance on the US for security?
The US-Australia alliance has been traditionally sturdy; however, it has reached an excessive factor throughout the last decade between 2001-2011 as the relationship became greater globally. There is a different tendency amongst supporters of the US-Australia alliance to focus on gift and past achievements and to overlook the ability issues that may confront the partnership within the future. Specifically neglected are three crucial demanding situations revolving around the ‘alliance safety catch 22 situations’, itself characterized utilizing the dual fears of abandonment and entrapment. Australia ought to undertake a higher proactive position in pushing for stronger talks with the U.S on these issues. (George, 2007).
There are no countries these days that has the capability to rival the US as an international military power seriously, and this position is unlikely to amend in the near future. O’neill (2012) states that “US nuclear planning has become more conscious of the need to address China’s ability to potentially hold American and allied objectives at ransom”. While Australia assumes that the US could extend its nuclear shield in an occasion that Australia is exposed to atomic intimidation or attack, this solidarity, however, has never been formally exhibited (Griffiths, 2014).
Australia has continually had military support from outside of its defense. Britain became that essential aid until the British prominence over time got undermined. Australia now has a strong alliance with the US, who has been supporting and assisting Australian defense, but why does Australia always need an outside power for helping its defense? Australia and Singapore are the only international locations in the vicinity whose military is externally positioned. All the others in South-East Asia have a national functional army directed mainly towards the suppression of inner unrest, despite the fact that this also offers them a capability to protect themselves against foreign invasion. India is developing blue water navy that would mission power beyond its borders, and China has a growing capacity to function out of its limits.
North Korea is growing missiles that could reach South-East Asia (Baylis et al., 2016). There may be no danger to the Australian continent and it’ is far difficult to see one rising in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, within the 60 years that ANZUS has been in existence, there was no hazard of invasion to Australia. ANZUS does now not require the US to defend Australia if it is attacked, but just to consider helping Australia out. There could be intense pressure from the US for Australia to join in other navy adventures that don’t always serve Australian interests (Bellamy, 2010).
The primary argument for the alliance is based on the belief that some currently unexpected hazard would possibly emerge in the destiny which could require US intervention to protect Australia, both via coming to Australia’s aid immediately or employing a deterrent to a capable aggressor. While a few people see that China poses a future danger to Australia, others do not.
The second line of argument is that the US presence contributes to local safety and offers a balance to China and different capability hegemonic powers. It is said that most other international locations in the place welcome this presence. Stability within site protects their lines of verbal exchange.
The third advantage we get from the alliance is to get right of entry to US intelligence, especially technical abilities, such as satellite imaging.
Another downside of the alliance is that Australia is seen as an ally of the U.S which can increase the threat of terrorist attacks on Australia. If the U.S is to guide Australia in its overseas ventures, their military planners face major trouble in operating out what pressure structure to build (Beeson et al., 2014).
Does it genuinely matter if other nations see Australia as clients of the United States? It may be argued that being visible as such gives Australia a few forms of safety from potential aggressors, but it could additionally increase the threat of terrorist assaults on them. For example, North Korea might be tempted to throw a missile at Australia because it is seen as a proxy for the US. If Australia is no longer seen as an ally to the U.S., North Korea might not bother to throw a missile at Australia.
Can Australia get hold of reliable intelligence that tells us something we want to understand that we could not get from other resources? Does this intelligence in any way further Australian hobbies? To reply this question, we might want to get right of entry to classified material. However, the US intelligence misled us on the Iraq war so it can pursue its interests. At the same time as it could be hard to reply this query, we can ask, what form of records do we want from the people to protect Australian pastimes? What intelligence do we get that we need due to the alliance?
In the past, Foreign Minister Bob Carr had advised to preserve the alliance but to undertake a more unbiased position within it. The query here is how unbiased we can be while maintaining our friendship within the US as a dependable ally? It is perhaps instructive to note that the best time the United States had despatched a professional ambassador to Australia was during the Whitlam years, while America was concerned that we had been becoming too unbiased. The others have been “pals of the President” who were given a comfortable job in return for domestic services rendered. (Griffiths, 2014).
Those are just a number of the questions that want to be asked; however, actually, it is time to begin asking them. It is one issue to stay a good buddy to the U.S, yet too close of an embrace and we will become too reliant and dependable on the U.S, and Australia can be seen by other countries as fence sitters with no backbone. American pursuits will not invariably be the same as Australian pursuits and vice versa. We do, but, also need to think about our strains of conversation and other alternatives with the rest of the world.
Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2011). The globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations (5th ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beeson, Mark; Higgott, Richard. (2014). The changing architecture of politics in the Asia-Pacific: Australia’s middle power moment? International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,14(2), 215–237. Retrieved from http://ezproxy.deakin.edu.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true;db=poh;AN=95992903;site=ehost-live;scope=site
Bellamy, A. J. (2010). The responsibility to protect and Australian foreign policy. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 64(4), 432–448.https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710903544106
George, J. (2007). Theory and practice in Australian International Relations: the search for identity and security. In An introduction to international relations: Australian perspectives(pp. 17–28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Griffiths, M. (2014).Realism and the national interest. In D. Baldino, A. Carr, ; A. Langlois(Eds.), Australian foreign policy: controversies and debates (pp. 11–18). South Melbourne,Vic.: Oxford University Press.
O’Neill, A (2012)THE AUSTRALIA-US ALLIANCE: ADDRESSING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES . Retreived from